Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

State of Utah v. Thomas C. Jackson : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graff; Attorney General; Kennethe A. Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellant.
E. Kent Winward; Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Thomas C. Jackson, No. 920346 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4294

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH

DOCUMENT
KFU
50

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.

Case No. 920346-CA

Priority No. 15

THOMAS C. JACKSON,
Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
*****************

AN APPEAL FROM A DISMISSAL OF FOURTEEN COUNTS
OF THEFT, ALL CLASS B MISDEMEANORS, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (1990),
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, GARFIELD
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE DON V.
TIBBS, PRESIDING.

E. KENT WINWARD
36 North 300 West
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Attorney for Appellee
JAN GRAFF
Attorney General
KENNETHE A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellant

RLF-D
JAN 2 8 1993

COURT

ALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.

]1

Case No. 920346-CA

]i

Priority No. 15

THOMAS C. JACKSON,
Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
*****************

AN APPEAL FROM A DISMISSAL OF FOURTEEN COUNTS
OF THEFT, ALL CLASS B MISDEMEANORS, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (1990),
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, GARFIELD
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE DON V.
TIBBS, PRESIDING.

E. KENT WINWARD
36 North 300 West
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Attorney for Appellee
JAN GRAFF
Attorney General
KENNETHE A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

4

ARGUMENT

4

I. THE STATE HAS NO RIGHT TO APPEAL

4

II. THE APPEAL VIOLATES DOUBLE JEOPARDY

7

III.

9

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED

CONCLUSION

12

ADDENDUM A: MAY 14, 1992 ORDER
ADDENDUM B:
PROVISIONS

APPLICABLE

STATUTES,

i

RULES

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Pages
City of Monticello v. Christensen. 788 P.2d 513, 516
(Utah 1990), cert, denied. 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990)

2

State v. Chugg, 749 P.2d 1279 (1988)
State v. Emmebt. 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34

7, 8
(Utah

1992) . . . .

9

State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1903) . . . 5, 6, 7, 8
State v. Thatcher, 157 P.2d 258 (1946) .

7,8

State v. O-erson, 489 P.,2d 110 (1971)

.8

Thompson v. Jackson. 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1987)

2

STATUTES AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-403

4, 5, 6

UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-17-3

1, 2, 6, 8, 11

UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18a-l

1,4, 6

RULE 17 (o) UTAH CRIMINAL RULES OF PROCEDURE . . .1, 2, 6, 8, 11

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

\

Case No. 920346-CA

i

Priority No. 15

THOMAS C. JACKSON,
Defendant/Appellee.
JURISDICTION
The state claims to have jurisdiction in this case based on §
77-18a-l(2)(a) Utah Code Ann.

However, the State has no right to

appeal the case, since the Order appealed is an order of acquittal,
rather than an order of dismissal.

Since the State cannot appeal

the decision, the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this
case.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The state claims only one issue in this appeal.

However,

several issues must be addressed.
1.

Is the State statutorily barred

from bringing this

appeal?
2#

Is the appeal moot because the appeal brought by the
State is in violation of the Double Jeopardy clauses of
the Federal and State Constitutions?

3.

Did the trial court properly grant Defendant' s motion for
a directed verdict pursuant to Rule 17(o) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure and §77-17-3 of the Utah Code
Annotated?

The jurisdictional questions raised in the first two issues are
ones which must be addressed by the court before it can proceed to
the merits. The Court of Appeals in Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P. 2d
1230 (1987) held:
The fundamental and initial inquiry of a court is always
to determine its own jurisdictional authority over the
subject matter of the claims asserted. Upon a
determination by the Court that its jurisdiction is
lacking, its authority extends no further than to dismiss
the action.
The standard of review for questions of law would be one of
correctness. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516
(Utah 1990), cert, denied. 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990).

However, no

particular standard of review has been established for reviewing a
trial

court's decision directing

a verdict in

favor of the

Defendant, pursuant to Rule 17(o) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and §77-17-3 of the Utah Code Ann., since these decisions
are deemed acquittals by statute.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a dismissal of fourteen counts of
theft, all class B misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-404 (1990), in the Sixth Judicial District Court, in and for
Garfield County, State of Utah, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs,
presiding. (R. 84-89). At defendants jury trial, counts I and II
were dismissed with prejudice by stipulation
attached at Addendum A ) .

(Order, R. 152,

Counts XVI and XVII were dismissed

because evidence showed that property alleged to have been taken
was inaccessible to defendant (R. 152-153; T. 200-02).

The trial

court granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the
2

remaining

counts, finding

that the

State

failed

to present

believable evidence of intent to commit the theft (R. 153; T. 20005).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The Court ordered the case dismissed based on insufficient
evidence by the prosecution, particularly evidence relating to
Defendant's unauthorized control of the property and the intent to
permanently deprive.
2.

See, Addendum A.

The fourteen counts being appealed were derived from a

statement given by Mr. Jackson to an officer that he had been
authorized to take 6 to 9 gallons of diesel a week to cover his use
of his personal vehicle. (T. 197-198).
3. The central question remaining in the case was whether Mr.
Jackson had been actually authorized to take the fuel.

Both the

superintendent with authority to allow Mr. Jackson to take the fuel
and

the

investigating

officer

testified

that

there

was

a

possibility of a mistake on Mr. Jackson's part in believing that he
was authorized.

(T. 169, 196).

4. Faced with a substantial likelihood that the Defendant had
been mistaken in believing he was authorized to take 6 to 9 gallons
a week, the trial court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at
the close of the prosecution's case. (T. 204).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and rules
are compiled in Addendum B. The applicable statutes are §76-1-403;
§77-17-3 and §77-18a-l of the Utah Code Annotated. The applicable
3

rule is Rule 17(o) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The

applicable constitutional provisions are the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The State does not have the right to appeal the acquittal of
Mr. Jackson.

A directed verdict for insufficient evidence at the

close of the prosecution's case acts as an acquittal as defined in
§76-1-403 of the Utah Code Ann. Acquittals are non-appealable.
In a similar vein, jeopardy attached when the jury was sworn
and the evidence was presented. The subsequent acquittal, via the
directed verdict, acts as a bar to the appeal under the State and
Federal Constitutions.
Finally, the prosecution failed to produce believable evidence
of the Defendant's intent to commit the crime of theft.

Of the

fourteen counts that were dismissed, only two counts involved any
actual witnesses.

The individual who could authorize the use of

the fuel stated under oath that the Defendant could have been
mistaken about his authorization to utilize company fuel. He also
stated that he had authorized the Defendant to take fuel on at
least one occasion and had authorized other workers to use hundreds
of gallons of fuel during the same time period.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE STATE HAS NO STATUTORY RIGHT
TO APPEAL THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER.
The Order of the District Court acted as an acquittal, which
the State does not have the right to appeal. The State is claiming
4

its right to appeal based on §77-18a-l(2) (a) of the Utah Code Ann.,
which states "An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: (a)
A final judgment of dismissal . . . "
The threshold question for determining whether the State can
appeal the May 4, 1992 Order is whether the Order acts as a
dismissal or an acquittal.

The Utah Supreme Court in State v.

Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1983), stated:
The label attached to a ruling by a trial judge is not
determinative of whether the termination of a criminal
prosecution is an acquittal* United States v. Scott, 437
U.S. 82, 96-97 (1980); United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977). A ruling that
constitutes a factual resolution in favor of the
defendant on one or more of the elements of the offense
charged is an acquittal. United States v. Scott, supra at
97; United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra at
571.
In the instant case, the trial court "dismissed1 the
theft charges because of its determination that there was
inadequate proof of the requisite intent to commit the
crime charged. Although the ruling was labeled a
•dismissal1 by the trial court, it was clearly based on
the trial court's assessment of the evidence and is an
acquittal and not a 'dismissal1 as that term is used in AU
71-35-26(c). See United States v. Scott, supra; United
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra. The State's
appeal of the theft counts must, therefore, be dismissed
because an acquittal is not appealable. Cf. State v.
Davenport, 30 Utah 2d 298, 517 P.2d 544 (1973); State v.
Overson, 26 Utah 2d 313, 489 P.2d 110 (1971).
(emphasis added).
The statutory definition of "acquittal" is found in §76-1403(2) of the Utah Code Ann.

The statute states:

(2)
There is an acquittal if the prosecution
resulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier of facts
or in a determination that there was insufficient
evidence to warrant conviction. . . .
(emphasis added). An acquittal is not narrowly defined to include

5

only a finding of not guilty by the trier of fact

An acquittal

also occurs when a determination is made that there is insufficient
evidence to warrant the conviction•

The Order signed by the

District Court specifically sets forth the grounds for acquitting
Mr. Jackson: "[T]he Court is of the opinion that the State failed
to present sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case on
any of the remaining counts of the information." (emphasis added).
The Court's May 4, 1992 Order was based on Rule 17(o) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Rule 17(o) states:

(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the
prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the evidence,
the court may issue an order dismissing any information
or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that
the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the
offense charged or any lesser included offense.
(emphasis added).

The applicable statutory provision is §77-17-3

of the Utah Code Ann. which contains similar language:
When it appears to the court that there is not
sufficient evidence to put a defendant to his defense, it
shall forthwith order him discharged.
(emphasis added).
The Court's Order, the applicable rule and the applicable
statute allowing the court to make the acquittal ruling, state that
the ground for a directed verdict is for insufficient evidence.
Under the definition in §76-1-403(2), the Court's Order was an
acquittal, which cannot be appealed.
The State, in its brief, makes various arguments about the strength
of the trial court's finding of insufficient evidence. This is not
relevant.
authorize

"Section 77-35-26(c) [currently §77-18a-l] does not
the

State to appeal
6

an acquittal, no matter

how

overwhelming

the

evidence

against

the

defendant

may

be."

MusselmanF at 1065.
II.
THE STATE'S APPEAL VIOLATES THE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE U.S. AND UTAH
CONSTITUTIONS
In conjunction with the fact that the state is statutorily
barred from appealing the trial courtfs Order, this appeal violates
the double jeopardy clause of the U.S. and Utah Constitutions.
Jeopardy

attached when the jury was sworn and

presented.

evidence was

The very issue before the Court in this case was

presented in State v. Musselman, supra, at 1065:
An appellate court, on principles deeply rooted in the
double jeopardy clauses of the Utah and Federal
constitutions, and by the very nature of the judicial
process itself, may not reassess an acquittal even though
the acquittal was made under an incorrect application of
the law or an improper determination of the facts. United
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra. Once a criminal
charge has resulted in an acquittal by the trier of fact,
the prohibition against double jeopardy prevents that
determination from ever again being challenged. It is of
no consequence that the determination was made as a
matter of law by a directed verdict of acquittal, AX2 or
as a matter of fact by the trier of fact. See, e.g.,
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982); United States
v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra; United States v. Ball,
163 U.S. 662 (1896). AX3 Furthermore, for an appellate
court to render an opinion on appeal from an acquittal
would be to render an advisory opinion, which is beyond
our power. See State v. Overson, supra.
(emphasis added).

See, also. State v. Chuqq, 749 P.2d 1279 (1988)

[Appeal can't be taken from a directed verdict in a DUI case].
Even the case most heavily relied on by the State in their
brief was merely an advisory opinion. State v. Thatcher, 157 P.2d
258 (1946) involved a directed verdict based on the insufficient
7

evidence of recklessness by the Defendant.

The case ended in the

following words:
This being an appeal by the state in a criminal case,
the case is reversed but the trial court is directed to
proceed no further.
State v. Thatcher, 157 P.2d 258, 262 (1945). The current position
of the appellate courts is to not issue such advisory opinions when
the case before them is moot on account of the double jeopardy
clauses.

See, Musselman, at 1065; Chugg, at 1280; and State v.

Overson, 489 P.2d 110 (1971).
Both the Chugg and Musselman decisions dealt with appeals from
directed verdicts in a bench trial. The Thatcher decision involved
a directed verdict in a jury trial. The mere fact that a directed
verdict came in bench trial, rather than in jury trial,

is of no

consequence in relation to double jeopardy considerations.

The

grounds for a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 17(o) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure are the same for bench trials and
jury trials.

As stated earlier in Musselman, "[i]t is of no

consequence that the determination was made as a matter of law by
a directed verdict of acquittal, or as a matter of fact by the
trier of fact." Musselman at 1065.
This appeal of Mr. Jackson's acquittal is in violation of the
double jeopardy clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions as
defined in the Musselman case.

The case law is clear that a

directed verdict by the trial court in a criminal case, when based
on a finding of

insufficient evidence, is an acquittal and non-

appealable.
8

III.
THE COURT RULED PROPERLY IN FINDING
THAT THE STATE HAD FAILED TO PROVIDE
SUFFICIENT BELIEVABLE EVIDENCE TO
PUT THE DEFENDANT TO HIS DEFENSE
As stated earlier, §77-17-3 and Rule 17(o) set forth the
guidelines in determining whether or not the trial court should
direct a verdict at the close of the prosecution's case. In State
v. Emmett, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 34

(Utah

1992), the Supreme Court

restated the statutory grounds for review in a motion to dismiss:
When a motion for a directed verdict is made at the
close of the State's case, the trial court should dismiss
the charge if the State did not establish a prima facie
case against the defendant by producing 'believable
evidence of all the elements of the crime charged.'
The situation in the case currently before the court was that
the prosecution had failed to present any believable evidence upon
which a reasonable jury could find that a crime had been committed.
Of the fourteen counts which are at issue in this appeal, only two
involve witnesses. The first occasion

involved two witnesses who

saw the Defendant with the hose in his hand.

(T. 87, 115). One

witness to this event stated that he had no personal knowledge,
even after seeing Mr. Jackson with the hose, that any diesel fuel
had been taken. (T. 121). The other witness also stated that she
had no personal knowledge, despite what she had witnessed, that Mr.
Jackson took any fuel

(T. 100). The witness stated that checking

the nozzle was part of Mr. Jackson's job as a security guard (T.
98-99). She also stated that it was mechanically impossible for the
nozzle she witnessed Mr. Jackson holding to have fit his truck's

tank (T. 101). Finally, the witness testified that she couldn't
9

hear a pump running and it was impossible to get fuel without the
pump running (T. 104).
The questionable value of this testimony becomes even more
ridiculous, when it is not even tied to a specific count in the
information.

No exact date or time, just a general time period,

was obtained from the witnesses. The fact that Mr. Jackson had a
nozzle in his hand (which didn't fit his gas tank) was nothing out
of the ordinary. It was part of his job as security officer on the
Burr Trail to check on whether or not equipment had been tampered
with.
The other eyewitness occasion was the planned event by Mr.
Haws.

In his testimony, he stated that he didn't want any action

taken until he could catch Mr. Jackson in the act, which he said he
did a week later (T. 167). Mr. Haws was also the only individual
on the job site who could authorize the use of diesel fuel. In the
same time period that Mr. Jackson was charged with theft of less
than 140 gallons of diesel, over 2,577 gallons of gasoline were
used by other employees for their personal vehicles (T. 169). Mr.
Haws testimony on recross is particularly telling:
Q The standard company rule, I mean if there was a general
rule and we could put it down in writing would be: You used
your vehicle for company use, talk to you, you got gas; is
that right?
A Um-hum.
Q To shorten it down, it would be if you use your personal
vehicle for company use, you get gas; is that the rule?
A If they go through me, yes.
. . .

Q Okay. All you can tell the Court is that Mr. Jackson might
have had a mistaken assumption; is that right?
10

A Yes.
Q But if he assumed wrongly, it wouldn't be criminal, would
it?
A It wouldnft be. But—
Q Okay. And he offered to pay you back because he was sorry
about the mistake; right?
A Yes
(T. 169-170). Mr. Haws, in his earlier testimony, could recall no
instance in which he actually informed him of the company policy
(T. 139).

It was faced with this weak testimony that the trial

court found that no believable evidence had been presented that Mr.
Jackson had committed the crime of theft (T. 203-204).
Finally, the State in their brief, rely on the judge's
statement that even if the jury were to convict the defendant, it
would feel compelled to grant a motion to dismiss after the
completion of the case because of the insufficient evidence (T.
204).

This statement by the court is not an admission that a

reasonable jury could find Mr. Jackson guilty, but an appropriate
rendition of the law set forth in §77-17-3.
Although the finding of a directed verdict is a matter of law
for the trial court, by necessity, the court must rule on the
believability of the evidence presented to that point.
17-3 and Rule 17(o).

See, §77-

The evidence in this case was so weak and

watered down that no believable evidence was presented to prove
intent. The trial court was merely fulfilling its statutory duty.

11

CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellee respectfully requests that the court find
that the State has no right to make this appeal and that the appeal
is in violation of the double jeopardy clause of the State and
Federal Constitutions.

Furthermore, the trial court was acting

within its statutory powers when it properly dismissed the fourteen
counts.
Submitted this 15th day of January, 1993.

&

_

E. Kent Winward
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Kenneth A. Bronston, Assistant Attorney General, attorney for
appellant, 236 State Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 on the
19th day of January, 1993.
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ADDENDUM A

N O 3 l ^ J L ^ D 3 FILED

MAY 01 l%>
Clerk
o W v ^ y "^\vn_y pcrt- •
WALLACE A. LEE #5306
Garfield County Attorney
55 South Main Street
Panguitch, Utah C4759
Telephone: 676-2290
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff,

;1

ve,

;

TOM JACKSON,

ji

Defendant.

ORDER

Criminal No. 91-CR-309

;

This matter came before the Court for jury trial on the 19th
day

of March,

1992, the

Honorable

Don V.

Tibbs

presiding*

Defendant was present in Court and was represented by his attorney,
E* Kent Winward.

The State of Utah was represented by Wallace A-

Lee, Garfield County Attorney.
By stipulation of Counsel, Counts I and II of the information
were dismissed with prejudice.

After the jury was impaneled and

sworn, the Court and jury heard opening statements of counsel and
testimony of witnesses for the state of Utah.

After the State of

Utah rested its case, Defendant moved for dismissal of Counts XVI
and xvil§ and the motion was granted because during the period of
time covered by these two counts, the fuel tank and equipment at

are vs. Jackson
dei

Criminal N

91-CR-309

the site %/ere locked, and Defendant could not have taken fuel from
them.
After the Court dismissed Counts XVI and X*Llt

the Defendant

moved for a directed verdict on the remaining counts.

After

hearing arguments of counsel relative to the motion for directed
verdictf tile Court is of the opinion that the State failed to
present sufficicsxifc evidence to make o\*t a prima facie case on any
of the remaining counts of th€* information.

Specifically, the

Court finds that the State of Utah did not present a prima facia
case that Lefendant took unauthorized control over the property of
another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
NOW THEREFORE, Defendant's motion for a directed verdict is
granted and this case Is hereby dismissed with prejudice,
DATED this

3o

day Of

/L>s.

L

BY THE COURT:

, 1992.

ADDENDUM B

76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for
offense out of same episode.
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent
prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of
the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was
or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the
former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the
defendant that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and
that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a
fact that must be established to secure conviction in the
subsequent prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a
finding of not guilty by the trier of facts or in a determination
that there was insufficient evidence to warrant conviction. A
finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of
the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a
judgment of guilt that has not been reversed, set aside, or
vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been reversed, set
aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a judgment;
or a plea of guilty accepted by the court.
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the
termination takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not
amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after a jury has been
impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial
is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination
of prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the
termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the
termination is necessary because:
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial
in conformity with the law; or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not
attributable to the state that would make any judgment entered
upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not
attributable to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the
trial without injustice to the defendant or the state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a
fair trial.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-403, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196,

77-17-3. Discharge tor insufficient evidence.
When it appears to the court that there is not sufficient
evidence to put a defendant to his defense, it shall forthwith
order him discharged.
History: C. 1953, 11-11-3,

enacted by L. 1980, ch. 15, 2*

77-18a-l. Appeals - When proper*
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or
plea;
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the
substantial rights of the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review
the appellate court decides the appeal would be in the interest
of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason
of a mental disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a
pending prosecution.
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a
finding of double jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part
of it invalid;
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to
suppress evidence when upon a petition for review the appellate
court decides that the appeal would be in the interest of
justice; or
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a
plea of guilty or no contest.
History: C. 1953, 77-18a-l, enacted by L. 1990, ch. 7, 10.
Compiler's Notes. - This chapter recodifies Subsections (2),
(3), and (9) of former Section 77-35-26, which is Rule 26 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. For notes to cases construing
that rule, see the Court Rules volume.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1990, ch. 7,
effective on July 1, 1990.

12 makes the act

RULE 17
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at
the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an order
dismissing any information or indictment, or any count thereof,
upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to
establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included
offense•

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process of law
and just compensation clauses*]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.

Sec* 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense
is alleged to" have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases, In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fe^s to secure the
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
History: Const, 1896.
Cross-References* - Rights of defendants, statutory provisions,
77-1-6.

